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FEMINISM AND POST-STRUCTURALISM
Joan C. Williams*

THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAw. By Zillah R. Eisenstein. Berkeley: University o.f California Press. 1988. Pp. x, 235. $25.
For more than a century feminists have split over the issue of
whether women are basically the same as men or basically different.
In the early twentieth century, the split played out between supporters
of protective labor legislation (pp. 201-10) and their opponents in the
National Women's Party. 1 A similar split has emerged in the late
twentieth century. "Difference" feminists argue that women are disadvantaged when they are treated like men in the context of such issues as pregnancy leave and divorce. Treating women the same ·as
men, they argue, denies the real and obvious differences. 2 The most
obvious of these is that women get pregnant, but difference feminists
do not stop there. Many argue that women are different from men not
only in terms of their biology but in terms of their values and their
"voice." 3
This debate has often raged bitter and has consumed energy that
would be better spent working toward widely held feminist goals.
Thus it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of Zillah Eisenstein's
ambition in The Female Body and The Law: to mobilize post-structuralism to move beyond the "sameness-versus-difference" debate.
Eisenstein is one of a number of writers who are shifting the focus
of feminist theory. Some influential earlier theorists developed a critique of Western epistemology, arguing that it is in some sense
"male. " 4 They argue instead in favor of modernist, contextualized
thinking, which they link with the attributes of traditional femininity. 5
More recently, theorists have turned their attention from the essential* Professor of Law, American University. B.A. 1974, Yale; J.D. 1980, Harvard; M.C.P.
1980, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. - Ed. The author wishes to thank Ruth Colker
for co=ents on a prior draft and Lisa Chase for research assistance.
1. Sees. WARE, BEYOND SUFFRAGE: WOMEN IN THE NEW DEAL 77-79 {1981); N. Corr,
THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 117-42 {1987).
2. See, e.g., Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change,
1983 WIS. L. REv. 789.
3. See, e.g., c. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). For a listing of some law review
articles influenced by Gilligan, see Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 803
n.17 (1989).
4. See, e.g., s. HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM 30-57 (1986); E. KELLER,
REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE 80-89 {1985); Keller, Feminism and Science, in FEMINIST THEORY 113 (N. Keohane, M. Rosaldo & B. Gelpi eds. 1981).
5. E. KELLER, supra note 4, at 158-76.
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ism of traditional Westem thought to the essentialism of feminist
thought. Eisenstein's book is part of a broad attack on essentialism in
both feminist theory and women's history. An early contribution was
historian Nancy Hewitt's influential article, "Beyond the Search for
Sisterhood," in which Hewitt questioned the existence of a unitary
"women's culture" by pointing out race and class distinctions among
American women. 6
Hewitt's article signaled a major reorientation among American
feminists. In 1988, Elizabeth Spellman published Inessential Woman,
a book-length study of how the dominant strains in feminist thought
have privileged the voice of white, middle-class women, marginalizing
the voices of other races and classes. 7 Other anti-essentialists, like
Eisenstein, have turned to post-structuralism for help in deconstructing the notion of an abiding, presumably stable set of differences between men and women. Notable contributions include a special issue
of Feminist Studies devoted to deconstruction8 and the recently published collection entitled Feminism/PostModernism edited by Linda
Nicholson. 9
Feminists' post-structuralism draws on different elements in poststructuralist theory than did critical legal scholars in the early 1980s.I0
Critical legal scholars focused on the notion that language generally,
and the law in particular, yields not determinate meaning but only the
"free play" of possible meanings. Thus they argued that doctrine was
infinitely manipulable because it is fundamentally indeterminate. II
Feminists focus not on the indeterminacy critique, but on post-structuralism's ability to deconstruct false dichotomies. Eisenstein seeks to
deconstruct not only the male/female dichotomy, but also the sameness/difference debate. Here she joins Joan W. Scott, whose insightful
analysis suggests ways of int_egrating these two positions, which traditionally have been considered mutually exclusive. I2
Eisenstein's insight that post-structuralism can be used to transcend the sameness/difference debate is apt, as is her implicit decision
about how to end the debate: through respectful integration of each
6. Hewitt, Beyond the Search for Sisterhood: American Women's History in the 1980s, 10
Soc. HIST. 299 (1985).
7. E. SPELLMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1988).
8. 14 FEMINIST STUD. No. 1 (Special lss., Spring 1988).
9. FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM (L. Nicholson ed. 1990).
10. Pp. 46-47. It is interesting (and perhaps flattering) to see political scientists turning to
legal literature when they explore post-structuralist themes. Eisenstein cites primarily the classics of critical legal studies 'literature. See pp. 43-47.
11. See M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); see also Minda, The
Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, SO OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (1989).
12. Scott, Deconstructing Equality Versus Differences: Or, the Uses ofPost-Structuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33 (1988). Scott's essay is an outstanding example ofpoststructuralist feminist scholarship that avoids the pitfalls noted in the text, infra text accompanying notes 23-24.
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side's insights, rather than through the triumph of either side in a victory that would by its nature be Pyrrhic, given feminism's goal of
sisterhood.
While Eisenstein's book is promising, and her inquiry is rich and
suggestive, her book has limitations as an attempt to apply post-structuralism to feminism. I first argue that her approach founders on
some familiar shoals of post-structuralism: overly self-conscious language that may unwittingly reinforce the dualisms she intends to challenge. Eisenstein also fails to follow through the full implications of
post-structuralism's rejection of absolutes. Once we as feminists reject
Truth, and are le~ only with arguments in favor of our interpretations,
we are brought face to face with the need to persuade others to see the
world as we do. This stance highlights the limitations of an abstract,
allusive post-structuralist approach that is primarily oriented toward
academics. I argue that moving beyond sameness and difference involves two separate tasks, each of which requires us to meld theoretical insights with additional information. To move "beyond
difference," we need a detailed redescription that helps people recognize the artificiality of the gender verities they "see" at work around
them. For this, we need psychological data that allows us to see how a
continuum of behavior variation is so consistently interpreted as a
male/female dichotomy. The Female Body suggests theoretical reasons in favor of continua, instead of dichotomies, but does not sustain
a sufficiently detailed redescription to help people see how the world
can be reinterpreted without the traditional gender dichotomy.
If Female Body is of limited use in moving "beyond difference," it
also is of limited use in explaining why treating women "the same" as
men has backfired in contexts such as divorce. To analyze why the
principle of equal treatment for similarly situated persons has redounded to the detriment of women, one must highlight the structural
constraints that preclude most women from being "similarly situated"
to men with respect to work and family roles. Here Eisenstein's prior
Marxist work provides guidance on how to move beyond "sameness"
to a fundamental challenge to the structure of wage labor.
A.

Eisenstein~

Post-Structuralism

Eisenstein sets out her core post-structuralist analysis in Chapter
One. She turns to post-structuralism's critique of the Western tendency to privilege dichotomies over pluralities in order to help transcend the notion of a "natural" dichotomy between men and women. 13
Her central insight is simple but powerful. In place of the traditional
dichotomy between men, characterized by one set of traits, and
13. Chapters I, 3, and 6, all of which advocate the need to abandon the notion of sexual
dichotomy in favor of a plurality of differences, become repetitive at times, particularly since
Eisenstein does not give much detail about what the new continuum of differences will look like.
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women, characterized by a mutually exclusive set, Eisenstein proposes
a "radical pluralist methodology" that critiques difference on the
grounds that it "denies variety and applauds homogeneity" (p. 35).
"What if there are multiple differences of sex that are completely related to differences of gender rather than a 'difference' of sex established in nature that differentiates all women from all men?" (p. 57).
The basic thrust of Eisenstein's critique is against difference, in
keeping with her history as a sameness feminist (p. 85). To her credit,
though, she does not stop there, as do many feminist scholars who
challenge essentialism. She eschews an unreflective privileging of plurality, in deference to the post-structuralist tenet that there is no one
truth, no "privileged text." "It is important," she warns, "not to overstate the heterogeneity of differences to the point of silencing the similarities and unities that exist" (p. 35). Here Eisenstein finds her way
back from post-structuralism to her abiding belief, which she formerly
expressed in Marxist language, that certain power relationships in our
society underlie its apparent malleability and diversity (pp. 18-19).
I admire her attempt to keep both plurality and unity simultaneously in focus. Not many post-structuralists take post-structuralism's
anti-essentialist message seriously enough to apply that message to
anti-essentialism itself. Yet having set out for herself the hard discipline of self-critique, Eisenstein is less than successful in delineating
how to resolve the tension between unity and plurality. She notes that
"phallocentrism is multicentered, [and] takes diverse historical, cultural forms" (p. 41). But we need more than this abstract statement to
enable us to assess the complex relationships between unity and diversity - and, in particular, to respond to the familiar charge that the
diversity masks an underlying unity of patriarchal oppression.
Though Eisenstein uses post-structuralism in a fruitful way to articulate the complexity of the program that lies before us, her (post-structuralist) tendency to remain on a high level of abstraction makes her
treatment less satisfying than it might be.
Her post-structuralist style has other drawbacks. A key one is her
decision to structure her discussion around a central metaphor, pitting
"the phallus" against "the pregnant body." What does Eisenstein
mean by her persistent references to biology? Initially, I found her
terminology confusing; eventually, I concluded that her exhortation to
"decenter the phallus" usually referred to the need to abandon the
male standard. 14 This is a traditional feminist point, perhaps best expressed in Catharine MacK.innon's biting formulation, as quoted by
Eisenstein:
14. Pp. 4, 66. This is particularly true in chapter 2. In chapters 4 and 5, "reconstructing the
phallus" refers to conservative efforts to preserve men's traditional advantages and lure (or force)
women back into traditional roles. These two ideas seem distinct enough to be treated as separate issues instead of being lumped together with phallic imagery.
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"There are two options .... The first option I call the 'male standard':
Women can be the same as men. In law, it is called gender neutrality.
The other option I call the 'female standard': You can be different from
men. In law, it is called special protection." Either way, men articulate
the standard of assessment. "You can be the same as men, and then you
will be equal, or you can be different from men, and then you will be
women." 15
If this is indeed what Eisenstein means, why doesn't she say so? She is
not talking about the phallus at all - nor is she talking about the
biological difference of pregnancy in her oft-repeated dichotomy between the phallus and the pregnant body. Instead, she discusses a variety of issues, notably that societally valued "objective" modes of
human thought are identified as male (p. 24), that male life patterns
yield privileged access to money and power (pp. 63, 66-69, 98-116),
and that concerns over inappropriate sexual expression often are expressed as the need to control the sexuality of women (pp. 154-74, 18490). To group these issues under a simple dichotomy between phalluses and pregnant bodies simply serves to reinforce an old mistake. If
we as feminists do not want other people to confuse these issues with
our biology, we should avoid using the language of biology to talk
about them. 16
Eisenstein, of course, understands that these issues concern the
structure of society, not of human bodies. She intends to critique,
rather than reinforce, the way society traditionally has rationalized
differences in social roles by arguing that social differences flow "naturally" from differences in biology. Nonetheless, she comes uncomfortably close to perpetuating the traditional confusion of these issues with
biological sex differences.17
Eisenstein's persistent translations of societal problems into physical terms highlights another risk: that feminists will spend valuable
time and energy translating into post-structuralist terminology insights widely expressed and accepted. This is a particular risk in
Chapters Two, Four, and Five, in which Eisenstein critiques the male
norm implicit in liberal law generally, and in New Right thought in
15. P. 55. Eisenstein is quoting remarks made by MacKinnon in Feminist Discourse, Moral
Values and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 20 (1985) (a transcription of a
discussion at the law school of the State University of New York in Buffalo).
16. Eisenstein's terminology may be influenced by the language of French feminism. For
example, note her cites to Luce lrigaray. Pp. 32-33, 38, 54. But, as Eisenstein herself notes,
underlying Irigaray's language of genitalia is a persuasive essentialism Eisenstein rejects. P. 38.
17. Eisenstein discusses some fascinating material under the rubric of challenging the bright
line distinction that feminists traditionally have drawn between sex and gender, notably the insight that it is easier to change natural facts than cultural facts, seep. 87, and the insight that due
to improvements in nutrition, birth control, and overall health, what it means biologically to be a
woman today is extraordinarily different from what it meant before 1900, see pp. 92-93. But I do
not think she comes to terms with the risks inherent in abandoning feminists' traditional insistence on keeping sex and gender sharply separate.
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particular. 18 In Chapter Two, entitled "The Engendered Discourse(s)
of Liberal Law(s)," Eisenstein argues that
because law is engendered, that is, structured through the multiple oppositional layerings embedded in the dualism of man/woman, it is not able
to move beyond the male referent as the standard for sex equality.... It
is progressive to the degree that it assumes men and women to be the
same, and reactionary to the extent that its notion of what is "the same"
derives from the phallus. [pp. 42-43]

This is true, but is it new? In earlier work, Eisenstein herself highlighted the extent to which wage labor is premised on the traditional
life pattern of males. 19 Feminist lawyers have made points similar to
those Eisenstein makes in Chapter Two, notably about the Supreme
Court cases involving pregnancy (pp. 66-69) and state court cases involving divorce and custody. 20
Chapters Four and Five hold particular interest for lawyers because of the broad range of data they analyze, from court cases to
opinion polls (p. 142), books by New Right theorists George Gilder (p.
123) and Midge Deeter (p. 119), Ronald Reagan's 1986 State of the
Union Address (p. 127), and the statements of Ed Meese (p. 159) and
others in the pornography debate (p. 162). These chapters provide a
refreshing contrasno the dense formulations that dominate Chapters
One and Two. Eisenstein aptly uses these sources to support her argument that "current politics seeks to reestablish the white male as the
privileged standard." 21 Moreover, I found Eisenstein's suggestion that
"[p]ornography can help create a multiplicity of sexual imagery that
enhances women's equality by differentiating the female body from the
mother's body" (p. 173) particularly apt and (dare I say it?) provocative. Finally, Eisenstein develops in considerable depth the intriguing
argument that the conservative revolution masks a complex and con18. A great strength of chapters 4 and 5 is that Eisenstein combines her discussion of
Supreme Court cases with a discussion of the larger realm of political discourse. She includes in
her treatment not only cases, but also opinion polls, Reagan administration policies, and the
work of neo-conservatives and New Right theorists in the popular quasi-scholarly press. Pp.
120-32, 142-47. I cannot stress strongly enough that Eisenstein's book highlights the narrowness
of most legal writing. If we accept the assertion that law is an integral part of political discourse,
we need to create the space to consider law along with the kinds of sources Eisenstein mobilizes.
But American lawyers have always been better at telling each other we ought to do this than at
actually doing it: a parallel is the legal realists' exhortations to use data about society, which
never caught on in the way their theoretical statements did. See L. KELMAN, LEGAL REALISM
AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 229-31 (1986); Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social
Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 195 (1979).
19. Z. EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM 201-19 (1981).
20. Pp. 67-74. Notable on divorce issues is sociologist Lenore Weitzman's analysis of California trial courts' treatment of divorce cases. L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION
(1985).
21. P. 132. Both chapters 4 and 5 have the same title ("Reconstituting the Phallus"), though
each chapter has a different subtitle. Chapter 4 is subtitled "Reaganism and the Politics of Inequality"; chapter 5, "Reaganism and the Courts, Pornography, Affirmative Action, and
Abortion."
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tradictory consciousness that opens up the possibility for significant
change. 22
Other sections of these chapters, however, do not cover much new
ground, and at times seem to focus on translating traditional feminist
insights into post-structuralist terminology. At times the translation
does not seem helpful. One instance is the phallus/pregnant body
metaphor, but the point is a more general one. Eisenstein at times
adopts post-structuralism's characteristic style of wordplay and selfallusion, as when she notes that "our similarities are similarly different
and differently similar."23 She also engages in terminological debates
that may try the patience, as in her extended discussion of patriarchy
as opposed to phallocentric discourse. 24 By adopting post-structuralism's focus on terminology and word-play, Eisenstein implicitly
adopts its focus on persuading (or at least impressing) other scholars
with a highly theoretical focus. For a movement committed to the
insight that many alternative (even mutually exclusive) interpretations
are potentially valid, post-structuralism often seems oddly unfocused
on the need to persuade a broad range of readers. Instead, the premium often appears to be on highly abstract formulations that dramatize their authors'· awareness of complex theoretical issues.
To summarize, Eisenstein is right to spot post-structuralism's potential to move us "beyond difference" by suggesting that we reconceptualize the traditional sexual dualism as a larger grid of samenesses
and differences among human beings. But post-structuralism, at least
as Eisenstein applies it, has notable limitations in helping feminists
persuade our society to abandon the notion that men and women are
"naturally different." The self-celebratory strain of post-structuralism
threatens to distance feminism from one of its traditional strengths:
its ability to engage the political mainstream in terminology a broad
range of Americans can understand. I urge feminists in their encounter with post-structuralism to employ languages that persuade rather
than focusing their energies on developing arcane and at times precious formulations oriented toward other academics. 25
22. P. 39. See similar formulation on p. 35 ("'different similarities' and 'similar
differences' ").
'
23. P. 21. The distinction she draws between patriarchy and phallocentric discourse may
well be too important to be discussed primarily as a terminological issue.
24. Pp. 149-51. However, I find overly optimistic her assertion of a sharp disparity between
the views of the American public and the views represented by the conservative discourse that
has dominated the 1980s. P. 147.
25. Another stylistic mannerism Eisenstein adopts is the syndrome of writing "books about
books," in James Boyle's clever formulation. Some parts of chapter 1 read very much this way,
in particular Eisenstein's direct references to the work of other scholars. See, e.g., p. 19 ("I
disagree with Michael Walzer's statement that Foucault does not believe ..•"); p. 25 ("Donna
Haraway emphasizes this point."); p. 27 ("Anne Fansto-Sterling makes this point nicely."); p. 33
("Evelyn Fox Keller believes ... "); p. 33 ("Lowe and Hubbard further specify this method •.• ");
p. 33 ("Elaine Showalter articulates this method ... "). My objection is that this style of writing
makes Eisenstein's treatment seem more like a conversation between academic insiders than a
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Eisenstein recognizes that the need to persuade is at the center of
the intellectual tradition she has chosen. Her shift to discourse theory
includes, in good post-modem fashion, a perspective premised on the
rejection of absolute truths. In a manner both straightforward and
sophisticated, Eisenstein adopts the modernist critique of absolutes
while avoiding the relativist conundrum that "all truths are equal":
Without privileging truth, or reality, as self-justificatory (because of their
objective status), we are left with making arguments in behalf of our
interpretation. . . .
It is only within a standpoint that privileges objectivity and absolutes
that relativism and pluralism present a problem. Plurality does not
mean that all truths are equal; it merely uncovers the role of power in
defining truth. Once truth has been defined, we are free to argue in behalf of our interpretation, but we cannot use the claim to truth as a defense. [p. 23]

Eisenstein is right to insist that feminists must learn how to mobilize the now quite deeply rooted intellectual trends of our era - relativism, disclaimers of privileged viewpoints, and a focus on the
relationship between power and claims of truth and objectivity. But
she has not come to terms with an important implication of the world
without absolutes. If we are left only with arguments in favor of our
interpretation, we had better make sure our arguments are persuasive.
In this context, both of the traditions Eisenstein has worked within Marxism and post-structuralism - have significant limitations:
Marxism is outside the realm of acceptable rhetorics in mainstream
American politics; post-structuralism, as Eisenstein has used it, is too
focused on an academic audience.
Eisenstein herself suggests a more fruitful approach when she returns to her notion that liberalism is its own best critic (p. 49).26 We
need to reformulate the feminist position in a way that persuades people that it is most consonant with what they already hold as "obviously" true; and, in America, that means liberal rhetoric. In other
words, we need to continue the process Eisenstein documented in her
best-known prior work, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism,
where she traced out the steps by which liberalism's verity that all men
are equal was extended to include women. 27 The remainder of this
review will sketch briefly some promising avenues to help move feminism "beyond sameness" and "beyond difference."
B. Beyond Difference

Difference feminists have argued that equality only works where
broad discussion involving themes and issues of wide appeal - which, in my view, is a more
accurate way of describing Eisenstein's underlying agenda.
26. She developed this point in a prior work. Z. EISENSTEIN, supra note 19, at 214.
27. Id. at 89-173.

1784

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:1776

people are the same, whereas men and women are fundamentally different. Eisenstein points out that an effective strategy to use in deconstructing the abiding verity of sexual difference is to decry dichotomies
as simplistic. But she does not give us much specific guidance about
how to free ourselves of the deep-seated conviction that women are
nurturing, focused on relationships, and contextualized, while men are
focused on abstractions, on things rather than people. In a few
passages, she does what is easier: she challenges the man/woman dichotomy by pointing out that women are not a homogeneous group. 28
This is the traditional approach of "sameness" feminists, but it does
not preclude the response that, despite differences among women, the
differences between men and women are more fundamental.
Reaction to my own work (in which I have made parallel attempts
to dislodge the naturalness of the dichotomy between men and women)29 suggests that people need vivid illustrations to inspire them to
question the interpretation that men act one way and women another.
The first step is to empower people to see this as an interpretation of
behavior, rather than as a simple description of the way things are.
Abstract critiques of Truth and of dichotomies do not do the job, perhaps because what is involved is not a conscious intellectual decision
to embrace the male/female dichotomy. I sense that a broad range of
Americans are not so much recalcitrant as confused. While many
Americans disbelieve in the male/female dichotomy as an article of
faith (they believe instead that men and women are "equal"), they still
(believe they) see men and women acting differently. The problem is
not to convince people that the dichotomous approach is problematic,
but to show them how it is inaccurate as a description of the behavior
of themselves and the people around them. In short, the problem is
not one of recalcitrance; it stems instead from a failure of imagination.
We (as feminists) need to challenge an interpretation of men's and
women's behavior so powerful that we (as a society) simply cannot
imagine another way of looking at things. This is a classic post-structuralist insight if there ever was one, but again, when faced with a
fundamental failure of imagination, we need neither abstract formulations nor fancy talk. Instead, we need concrete descriptions that help
people recognize the artificiality of the i gender verities they "see" all
around them.
One promising approach is to use psychological data to break
down the notion that men and women "just act differently." The
traditional approach of "sameness" feminists was to show that variation among individuals of the same sex is greater than variation be28. P. 31. Here Eisenstein joins a well-established critique of difference feminism. For an
example influential in the history of women, see Hewitt, supra note 6.
29. See Williams, supra note 3, at 802-22, 840-43.
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tween the sexes. 30 Data from these studies dramatizes the contention
that humans form a continuum rather than two separate homogeneous, dichotomous groups. More recent studies, designed no doubt
with "difference" feminism in mind, challenge the notion that patterned differences between men's behavior and women's are attributable to permanent (and perhaps innate) psychological differences. An
example is a study of men who "mother," which found that men exhibit the "nurturing" characteristics commonly associated with women when they play the primary parenting role conventionally
assigned to females. 31 A third type of psychological study shows how
people shape their perceptions of males and females to conform with
preexisting stereotypes. An example here is a study of newborns that
documented how parents selectively interpret identical behavior in
newborns as evidence of masculinity or femininity.3 2
Psychological studies are one fruitful source to aid people's failure
of imagination in seeing through gender stereotypes. A second source
-perhaps more difficult to tap-is "anecdote." For example, it has
been my experience that women tend to interpret whatever they do in
the role of mother/housewife as "nurturing." One friend from a large,
ethnic family very focused on food views her role as "nurturing" because she nurses babies, cooks and urges food on older children, and
takes care of other physical needs. The children look to her husband
for play. She admits she's not much of a playmate, but views that as
stimulation, not nurturing. In my family, by contrast, I am the preferred playmate, and we have always assumed that play is the key to
nurturing.
Note that I have broken code. This no longer sounds like a lawreview piece. I have slipped into personal reminiscence. But just as
minority scholars have begun to ask whether the norms of legal writing are preventing them from saying what they need to say, 33 perhaps
feminist writers need to act more on the insight that "the personal is
political." In talking with other writers on feminist issues, I am struck
by the extent to which their work, like mine, is autobiographical. Perhaps we need to be more open about this, for two reasons. First, insights from our own lives may be suggestive of fruitful areas for
systematic research - for example, we need studies that identify
30. Perhaps the most famous example is the work of Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin. E.
MACCOBY & c. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES (1974). Note that this data
can be and has been flipped, by feminists of differences. Gilligan cites Maccoby and Jacklin's
evidence that men are more violent than women as support for her notion of differences. C.
GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at 41.
31. See Risman, Intimate Relationships from a Microstructural Perspective: Men Who
Mother, 1 GENDER & SOCY. 6 (1987).
32. Rubin, Provenzeno & Luria, The Eye of the Beholder: Parents' Views on Sex of
Newborns, 44 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 512 (1974).
33. See, e.g., Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989).

1786

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:1776

which characteristics families define as "nurturing" and that explore
how women treat the job of mothering. Second, evidence from our
own lives may help us as a society to see through the conventional
description of women as nurturing and men as not. Particularly
promising are studies such as Arlie Hochschild and Anne Machung's
The Second Shift, which focus on individual couples to paint a vivid
picture of gender realities more "objective" than "mere anecdote." 34
Psychological studies and anecdote can help us challenge gender
verities. The need to challenge people's imaginations with vivid reinterpretations of everyday events means that abstract post-structuralist
formulations are of limited utility in helping us move "beyond difference." The second major task for feminists is to move beyond "sameness." In a number of crucial contexts, many women have been
disadvantaged as a result of being treated "the same" as men. In divorce law, for example, equal treatment for women has meant loss of
the maternal presumption in custody disputes and a lowering of property and support awards. 35 Difference feminism also has been fueled
by the fact that although women have entered the work force, many
have not acted like men once they got there. Instead, they have
tended to end up on the "mommy track," 36 in lower-paying, often
dead-end jobs. 37
Difference advocates have a ready answer for these phenomena.
Women don't come out equal when treated the same as men, they
argue, because women aren't the same as men. Women are more focused on relationships than men, more nurturing, less ambitious. So it
is natural and appropriate that women's participation in the work
place should differ from men's: different work place goals are a basic
part of women's "different voice."38
This interpretation has proved powerfully persuasive and presents
an important challenge to the view that men and women are "basically" the same. One task is to reinterpret why women as a group are
not acting like men as a group in the family and the work place. I
have argued before that this fact reflects not psychological or biological "differences" but an entrenched system of gender privilege. 39
34. A. HOCHSCHILD & A. MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFI' (1989).
35. See, e.g., L. WEITZMAN, supra note 20, at xi-xiv, 231.
36. See, e.g., A. HOCHSCHILD & A. MACHUNG, supra note 32; Ehrlich, The Mommy Track,
Bus. WK., Mar. 20, 1989, at 126; Kantrowitz, A Mother's Choice, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 31, 1986, at
46; Lewin, "Mommy Career Track" Sets Off a Furor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1989, at A18, col. 1;
Rimers, Sequencers: Pu~ting Careers on Hold, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1988, at A21, col. 1.
37. See Jackson & Grabski, Perceptions of Fair Play and the Gender Wage Gap, 18 J, AP·
PLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 606 (1988); see also Cowan, Women's Gains on the Job: Not Without a
Heavy Toll, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
38. EEOC v. Sears, 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (offer of proof concerning the testi·
mony of Dr. Rosalind Rosenberg).
39. See Williams, supra note 3, at 822-36.
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Westem wage labor is premised on the notion of an ideal worker
with no child-care or housekeeping responsibilities. The shift to modem wage labor, temporally and geographically isolated from family
life, occurred simultaneously with the development of the ideology of
domesticity, which explained why women were peculiarly suited to
stay home and provide domestic services for their wage-laboring husbands. In other words, with the development of modem capitalism,
the costs of childrearing and housekeeping were privatized within the
modem family.
But mothers (at least in theory) were relieved of the burdens of
wage labor as well as its benefits. They, like their husbands, worked
only one "shift": in 1890, only 2.5% of married white women worked
outside the home. 40 What has happened now that the majority of
mothers have entered the work force?
By 1983, an employed mother in a male-headed household was
working an average of nearly fifty percent more hours than the traditional housewife. 41 One study calculated that, as a result of their
double shift of wage and domestic labor, working mothers on average
work one month of twenty-four-hour days more than their husbands
each year. 42 Working mothers generally have less leisure than their
husbands, get less sleep, get sick more often, and show other signs of
strain.43 The strain stems from the fact that society continues to deny
the inconsistency of two-earner families and a model of the Ideal
Worker that assumes a family member is providing child-care and
housekeeping services. The costs of this denial are being shifted onto
women. Husbands simply are not pulling their weight - one study
found that husbands' contribution to household work barely covers
the extra work their presence generates.44 Another study showed that
the husbands of employed women spend only 2. 7 more hours on child
care per week and 1.8 hours more on housework than do husbands of
housewives. 45 A third study showed that men did twenty percent of
the household chores in 1964; by 1981, that percentage had risen a
mere ten percentage points.46 Nor is the government helping women:
as is well known, the United States has been more resistant than virtually any other Western country to bringing child-care costs into the
40. See Williams, supra note 3, at 832 & n.150. Fully 51 % of black married women were in
the labor force in 1970. See L. WEINER, FROM WORKING GIRL TO WORKING MOTHER 89
(1985).
41. Heath & Ciscel, Patriarchy, Family Structure and the Exploitation of Women's Labor, 22
J. EcON. ISSUES 781, 787 (1988).
42. A. HOCHSCHILD & A. MACHUNG, supra note 34, at 3.
43. See id. at 8-10.
44. See Heath & Ciscel, supra note 41, at 788.
45. Id. at 787.
46. See J. PLECK, WORKING WIVES/WORKING HUSBANDS (1985); Burros, Women: Out of
the House But Not Out of the Kitchen, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
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public sphere.47
These choices should be recognized for what they are: choices to
make women bear virtually alone the role conflict inherent in a society
where both parents work under a system where the demands of
parenting and those of wage labor are fundamentally inconsistent.
We can now reinterpret the two phenomena often cited as evidence
that women have been disadvantaged by treating them "the same" as
men. Premise one: as women have entered the work force, they have
not acted like men once they got there. First, the evidence suggests
this is not entirely true. Data tantalizingly suggests that women without children act much more like men than women with children. 48
Women with children do not, because working mothers are not in the
same position as working fathers. Working mothers must shoulder
domestic duties that society is reluctant to define as "work." But these
duties are work - demanding and very time-consuming work. The
"working mother," without adequate support from her spouse or the
government, has two choices: work a double shift, at the cost of her
leisure, her sleep, and perhaps her health, or define her wage labor
obligation in a way that accommodates her domestic obligations - in
other words, go on the mommy track. Thus, women's "choice" is different from men's because they are in a very different situation from
men, who can perform as ideal workers confident they can count on
women - their wives or the women she hires - to work the "second
shift."49
Let's proceed to the second premise: women, when treated "the
same" as men, end up disadvantaged. Here a crucial context is divorce, and the analysis now is easy. While women are married, they
almost invariably contribute childrearing and housework to the family
far in excess of that contributed by their husbands. so But, just as that
work is invisible inside marriage, it is invisible upon divorce. So when
judges make support or property awards, they often ignore completely
or seriously undervalue the economic worth of those services.st Moreover, child-support awards never (so far as I know) take into account
47. See s. KAMERMAN, A. KAHN & P. KINGSTON, MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING
WOMEN 5 (1983); see also PP· 213-14.
48. Never-married women participate in the labor force at about the same rate as nevermarried men; with marriage, women's participation rate drops to between 55% and 60%.
Hayghe & Harges, A Profile of Husbands in Today's Labor Market, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct.
1987, at 12; see also Dowd, Work and Family in Restructuring the Workplace 15 (1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). Dowd's study contains a wealth of information on
work/family issues.
49. See P. PALMER, DOMESTICITY AND DIRT ix-xiv (1989).
50. See supra notes 41, 42, 45.
51. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 20, at 110-214. Some inroads have been made. See Cohen, What's a Wife Worth?, 11 FAM. ADvoc. 20 (1988) (wife's work increasingly taken into
account in valuing "separate" property for divorce settlement). But see L. WEITZMAN, supra
note 20, at 52-69 (most divorcing couples have little or no property to divide).
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that the custodial parent (the mother ninety percent of the time) is
contributing valuable childrearing services, usually at the cost of performing as an "Ideal Worker."s 2 Again, the result that women, when
treated "the same" as men, end up disadvantaged reflects not women's
"different voice," but their oppression, as society demands work from
women and then refuses to acknowledge that women are doing it, or
even that it is "work" at all.
To complete this argument about the limitations of sameness, we
must return to difference. The argument so far is that a key element of
women's "difference" stems from their different roles with respect to
parenting and wage labor. Feminists of difference would agree, but
tend to link these differences with women's different values. Difference advocates on the right argue that women's difference means they
"naturally" end up in different roles. s3 Difference feminists on the left
tend to argue in favor of transforming the social order so that it expresses "female" rather than "male" values. s4 But both types of difference feminists agree that women have values different from men.
Two responses are possible. The first concedes for a moment that
the different pattern of women's lives results from choices based on
values. But why should our society be structured so that anyone who
chooses to "parent" in a way more engaged than the traditional fathering role is condemned to the margins of economic life? This seems a
singularly undesirable way to run a society, particularly since child
specialists (and most parents) agree that a child with two "fathers" is
impoverished indeed.ss We must ask if it is ethical for society to condemn committed parents to relative poverty. For this is exactly what
we have done, as the feminization of poverty makes clear.s6 One response to the "different voice" argument, then, is that women's choice
in favor of active parenting should not be viewed as a rationale for
52. See Polikoff, Why Mothers Are Losing: A BriefAnalysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody
Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235 (1982).
53. George Gilder is an example. G. GILDER, SEXUAL SUICIDE (1973). Eisenstein discusses
his work at pp. 122-23, and that of other conservatives in chapters 4 and 5.
54. For example, see K. FERGUSON, THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY (1984),
and other works cited in Williams, supra note 3, at 810-13, 821-22.
55. Pediatricians Benjamin Spock and H. Berry Brazelton and child expert Penelope Leach
have taken leading roles in arguing that parents' work roles are inconsistent with the best interests of children. See Work and Families, WASH. PARENT, Nov. 1988, at 1, 3, 5 (report of an
April 1988 panel discussion in Boston); see also Brazelton, Stress for Families Today, INFANT
MENTAL HEALTH J., Spring 1988, at 65.
56. The impoverishment of committed parents is hidden as long as families are intact, but
emerges as a strong pattern when mothers have to fulfill both the mothering and the worker role,
either because of divorce, see L. WEITZMAN, supra note 20, at 184-261, or because the mothers
are single parents. Almost one in three female-headed households is poor, compared to only
about one in 18 male-headed households. See Williams, supra note 3, at 826. Three fourths of
black families with incomes below the poverty line are headed by women. Pearce, Welfare Is Not
for Women: Toward a Model ofAdvocacy to Meet the Needs of Women in Poverty, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 412, 413 (1985).
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blocking their access to the best jobs society has to offer. 5'
The second, more radical, response is to deny that women have a
different voice at all. Note that this is not a denial that women's life
patterns differ from those of men. It is a denial that the difference
stems naturally from some underlying difference between men's and
women's psyches. Again, the "beyond sameness" argument brings us
back to difference. Recall the study examining men who "mother"
that found that they exhibited nurturing characteristics commonly associated with women. 58 The study's author posited that the behavior
we associate with mothers is a byproduct not of the psychology of
women but of a social (mothering) role. 59 Is an argument that nurturing is "women's voice" simply a restatement of the fact that women
are the parents with primary child-care responsibility, and primarycare parents in this society generally behave (because of our norms of
parenting) in a gentle, supportive way?
This analysis reinterprets facts often cited as proof that men and
women are naturally different in a way that acknowledges the existence and the implications of gender differences (different social roles
based on sex), while challenging the traditional interpretation of these
differences as "natural." The analysis brings us back to Eisenstein's
book, for my analysis merely follows in Eisenstein's footsteps. In The
Radical Future of Liberal Feminism, Eisenstein presented an acute
analysis of the way the existing construction of the public (economic)
and private (family) functioned to privilege men and disadvantage women. 60 True, Radical Future used the language of Marxism, but it did
so in a way more useful in moving us "beyond sameness" than the
post-structuralist language of The Female Body and the Law. The
question is how to communicate that the different life patterns of men
and women are an integral part of a gendered system of power relations. 61 Radical Future suggests that we can use the language of liberalism to show how the current gender system treats mothers unfairly
and leads inexorably to inequality. 62 My analysis tries to act upon
Eisenstein's insight that liberalism is its own best critic, by stressing
the current system's inconsistency with the liberal norms of fairness
and equality. Women work two shifts, they do more housework, more
57. See Williams, supra note 3, at 813-22 (discussing EEOC v. Sears, 628 F. Supp. 1264
(N.D. Ill. 1986), ajfd., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988)).
58. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Note how difficult it is even to talk about
these issues because we have built into our language (in the word "mothering") the assumption
that people who play a certain child-rearing role will be female.
59. Williams, supra note 3, at 8-10.
60. Z. EISENSTEIN, supra note 19, at 201-19.
61. The formulation is Catharine MacKinnon's, although she uses it in different contexts.
See C. MACKINNON, Dff[erence and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-42 (1987); C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 92,
101-29, 215-21 (1979). .
62. Z. EISENSTEIN, supra note 19, at 201-53.
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child care, they are sick, run-down . . . but not "oppressed by patriarchical society." Marxism this explicit loses the ear of most Americans. We need to use liberalism's language of equality in a way that
communicates the fundamental unfairness of the gendered structure of
wage labor.

* * * * *

In conclusion, it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of Eisenstein's ambition to move feminism beyond the "sameness versus difference" debate. Moreover, Eisenstein highlights post-structuralism's
potential to deconstruct the male/female and the sameness/difference
dichotomies. Yet ultimately Eisenstein's metaphor threatens to perpetuate the traditional confusion between biological sex and social
gender roles. Her adoption of post-structuralists' characteristic style
at times focuses her attention on formulations oriented toward other
academics, instead of on persuading a broad range of Americans. In
short, her version of post-structuralism directs her attention away
from two central tasks that lie before us. To move "beyond difference," we must communicate the contingency and artificiality of the
gender verities people "see" around them. To move "beyond sameness," we must show how the current structure of wage labor rests
upon an entrenched system of gender privilege.

